Description

Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from that of beliefs and desires. Mele, also offers a provocative explanation of how we come to have intentions and elaborates on his earlier work concerning akratic failures of will.

Reviews

"Offers an excellent review of much of the recent literature in action theory. Philosophers and psychologists how do research in the philosophy of mind will find this book "engaging."--Choice

"A discussion rich in helpful commentary on some of the major issues in contemporary action theory."--The Thomist

Product Details

288 pages; 5-1/2 x 8-1/4; ISBN13: 978-0-19-507114-6ISBN10: 0-19-507114-X

About the Author(s)