Description

Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record straight, by advancing a version of the Humean theory of reasons which withstands this sophisticated array of objections.

Mark Schroeder defends a radical new view which, if correct, means that the commitments of the Humean theory have been widely misunderstood. Along the way, he raises and addresses questions about the fundamental structure of reasons, the nature of normative explanations, the aims of and challenges facing reductive views in metaethics, the weight of reasons, the nature of desire, moral epistemology, and most importantly, the relationship between agent-relational and agent-neutral reasons for action.

Features

• An ambitious monograph from a leading young philosopher
• Offers a sophisticated defense of a controversial theory of practical reason
• Raises and explores new questions about moral explanations

Reviews

"Mark Schroeder's Slaves of the Passions offers the best, most complete book-length defense available of a Humean conception of normative reasons for action. Part of what makes this book so needed, valuable, and worth celebrating is that it has had so few serious contenders for that title. But the book's virtues are not merely that it fills an exceedingly large gap in the literature. It is also wide-ranging, innovative, systematic, and rigorous.... The book is wide-ranging and complex."--David Sobel, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Product Details

224 pages; ISBN13: 978-0-19-929950-8ISBN10: 0-19-929950-1

About the Author(s)